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(Filed:  April 1, 2016) 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Introduction 
 Appellants Mark Miller and Jaquel Crews were convicted by a federal jury for 
their participation in a multimillion dollar drug organization that distributed hundreds of 
kilograms of cocaine and crack cocaine in Philadelphia’s Frankfort neighborhood for 
more than 20 years.  They have appealed their convictions and sentences.  We will 
affirm. 
Background 
 Because we write solely for the parties, we will provide only a brief outline of the 
factual background.  Miller and Crews were veterans of the illegal drug trade.  Testimony 
revealed that Miller had been selling cocaine at least since 1986, while Crews had been 
supplying drug dealers since 1996.  Together, the Appellants laundered millions of 
dollars in drug proceeds through the purchase of real estate and other assets.  Although 
neither Appellant was gainfully employed, they lived extravagantly, attending events like 
the Super Bowl and the MTV Video Music Award show.  They also laundered drug 
proceeds through the purchase of luxury items like mink coats, Breitling watches, and 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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more than $100,000 in diamond jewelry.  Both Miller and Crews routinely delivered 
money to a California-based cocaine supplier, flying between Philadelphia and Los 
Angeles and Philadelphia and Las Vegas on numerous occasions.  The supplier, in turn, 
would provide Crews and other members of the conspiracy with cocaine.1 
 After a ten-day trial, a jury convicted Crews and Miller of one count of conspiracy 
to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and fifty grams or more of crack cocaine 
between 1986 and November of 2007, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  Miller was also 
convicted of seven counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).  Crews was found guilty of ten counts 
of money laundering in violation of the same aforementioned statutes.  The Government 
filed forfeiture motions, seeking personal forfeiture money judgments against both 
Appellants in the amount of $5,000,000, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853, which the District 
Court granted.  At sentencing, the District Court imposed a 212-month prison sentence on 
Miller while Crews received a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment.  
 We granted Miller’s motion to consolidate his appeal with Crews.’  Together, and 
in some instances individually, they raise numerous challenges to their convictions, 
sentences, and the District Court’s forfeiture order.  We will discuss each issue in turn, 
beginning with the evidentiary claims.   
Exclusion of the Lofton Recordings 
 At trial, Crews and Miller attempted to introduce excerpts of telephone calls a 
Government witness, Craig Lofton, made from prison to various individuals on the 
                                              
1 App. 780-81a. 
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outside.  One of several witnesses called by the Government, Lofton testified to his 
knowledge and participation in Miller and Crews’ drug trafficking schemes.  The 
Appellants argued to the District Court that these excerpts would impeach Lofton by 
revealing incentives he had to lie on behalf of the Government.  The District Court 
permitted Miller to use eight of the requested twelve excerpts.  On appeal, Miller and 
Crews argue that the District Court abused its discretion by excluding the four remaining 
excerpted conversations from evidence.2  
 At the outset, we reject the Appellants’ overarching contention that the District 
Court failed to articulate a legal basis for excluding these four excerpts from evidence.  
The record clearly reveals the foundation for the District Court’s ruling: Federal Rule of 
Evidence 608.3  Under this rule, “extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific 
instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for 
truthfulness.”4  The District Court ruled these four excerpts to be extrinsic evidence and it 
did not abuse its discretion in doing so. 
 For example, the excerpt taken from a telephone conversation between Lofton and 
an unidentified woman during which Lofton discussed his belief that he and Crews were 
                                              
2 We review the District Court’s ruling as to the admissibility of evidence and its 
limitation on cross-examination for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Knight, 700 
F.3d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 
3 The District Court asked counsel for Appellant Crews: “So that these conversations are 
conversations that were made outside the courtroom.  They were made – they involve Mr. 
Lofton and other people, and the defendant Crews wants to use these conversations for 
impeachment – for credibility purposes under Rule 608(b), is that a fair statement?”  
Counsel for Crews responded “Fair enough.”  App. at 1445a.   
 
4 Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). 
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coming “home in two years,”5 is extrinsic because Lofton testified three years after 
making that statement.  By that time, he could no longer have had the expectation he was 
going to be released in two years since three had already passed.  Crews now argues that 
this excerpt should have been admitted nonetheless because it was contrary to Lofton’s 
testimony that he had not been given any promises or sentencing expectations by the 
Government.  This argument misses the important point that, at trial, Lofton was 
questioned about his then-current sentencing expectations; not the expectations he had in 
2009 when this telephone conversation was recorded.  Miller attacks this exclusion from 
a somewhat different angle, arguing it was admissible to prove Lofton expected to serve 
two years, not twenty-five.  But, this excerpt is irrelevant to Miller’s argument.  As we 
just noted, by the time he testified at trial, Lofton’s purported expectation of a two year 
sentence was already outmoded by a year, rendering his prior conversation about that 
expectation irrelevant.  Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its broad discretion in 
evidentiary matters by ruling this excerpt out of bounds. 
 Likewise, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by excluding excerpts 
from a telephone conversation in which Lofton speaks of being suicidal.  Here, Lofton 
was talking with another Government witness, Michael Durrant, in March of 2009.  
Lofton told Durrant that a ten-year sentence was “a long time,” and that “[a]nything 
underneath it, I’m extremely underneath that over it.  I’m upset.  I’m tore down.  Suicide 
                                              
5 App. at 1666a. 
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material.”6  The District Court found this particular excerpt to be extrinsic evidence of 
Lofton’s motivation for testifying, and we agree.  Lofton had already testified that he did 
not have an expectation of a reduced sentence in exchange for his cooperation with the 
Government.7  On appeal, Miller maintains that this excerpt was evidence of Lofton’s 
bias and that the District Court erred by preventing him from challenging Lofton.  We see 
nothing in the record that supports his argument.  Crews and Miller were unencumbered 
in their cross-examination of Lofton and questioned him in detail about his plea 
agreement and the possible sentence Lofton may have received had he not pleaded guilty.  
Further, Crews and Miller could certainly have recalled Lofton to question him about the 
other admitted excerpts, but elected not to do so.  Therefore, we see no abuse of 
discretion in the exclusion of this excerpt from evidence. 
 Lastly, Miller and Crews argue that two excerpts from a conversation Lofton had 
with an agent from the Drug Enforcement Agency should have been admitted into 
evidence.  These excerpts are part of a conversation between Lofton and a DEA agent 
concerning plans to take Lofton to meet with Government lawyers prior to his grand jury 
testimony.  In the first excerpt, after clarifying where Lofton was being held, the agent 
inquired whether Lofton would like “a nice sit down dinner” when they picked him up.8  
                                              
6 App. at 1668a. 
 
7 App. at 1455a. 
 
8 App. at 1668a. 
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Lofton thought that would be “lovely.”9  In the second excerpt, Lofton tells the agent 
“Yeah man, its three people that pretty much gonna walk through this thing.  You know 
what I mean.  You know them all.  I can’t call em out, but you know who they are.  One 
of ‘em already walked through the water look the devil in the face.  An he’s up on the 
west side.  Everybody can’t get a break but I make sure I protected them.”10  At trial, 
counsel for Miller and Crews tried to admit these excerpted conversations as evidence of 
Lofton’s inconsistent statements but acknowledged that Lofton had never been 
questioned about these statements.11  The District Court sustained the Government’s 
objection to the admission of this excerpt.12   
 Now on appeal, both Appellants maintain that the first conversation should have 
been admitted as evidence of bias.  Miller believes that this exclusion prevented him 
“from showing . . . that Lofton received special treatment from the investigating 
agents.”13  This basis for admission, however, was never argued to the District Court and, 
as such, is waived.14  And, even were it not, the record does not support this claim 
because Lofton was never questioned by the defense about the invitation to dinner, nor 
did the defense call the DEA Agent to be questioned about his offer.  Likewise, it was not 
                                              
9 Id. 
 
10 App. at 1667a. 
 
11 App. at 1454a. 
 
12 App. at 1454a, 1466a. 
 
13 Miller Br. at 26. 
 
14 United States v. Burnett, 773 F.3d 122, 130 (3d Cir. 2014).   
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an abuse of discretion for the District Court to exclude the second excerpt.  Nothing in 
that exchange was inconsistent with Lofton’s prior testimony and the excerpt makes no 
mention of coordination with other witnesses or any other type of conversation.  
 In sum, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to exclude the 
forgoing excerpts from Lofton’s recorded telephone conversations.   
Crews’ Mandatory Minimum Sentence 
 Next, Crews individually challenges his sentence, specifically the imposition of a 
statutorily mandated minimum term.  Prior to sentencing, the Government filed for a 
downward variance from the advisory guidelines range on account of assistance Crews 
provided in another prosecution.  The Government declined to file, however, a motion 
permitting a sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum of 240 months.  Crews 
offered several objections to his proposed sentence, including an objection based on a 
perceived Alleyne error as well as an objection to an enhancement for his leadership role 
in the offense.  The District Court granted Crews a downward variance, rejected his other 
challenges, and imposed the mandatory minimum sentence permitted by the statute—240 
months.  On appeal, Crews again attacks the propriety of his sentence.  We start with his 
claim of Alleyne error.    
 After the verdict was handed down, but before Crews was sentenced, the Supreme 
Court announced its decision in Alleyne v. United States.15  In Alleyne, the Supreme 
                                              
15133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013).  The jury verdict was announced on March 14, 2012.  The 
Supreme Court handed down its opinion in the Alleyne case on June 17, 2013, and Crews 
was sentenced on November 5, 2013. 
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Court held that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence is an element 
which must be determined by the jury.16  Therefore, where a factual determination such 
as a drug quantity “trigger[s] a statutory mandatory minimum sentence, [it] must . . . be 
submitted to a jury.”17  Crews was charged, at Count Five of the indictment, with 
responsibility for distributing “five kilograms or more, that is hundreds of kilograms, of 
mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, and 50 grams or more, 
that is multiple kilograms, of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of 
cocaine base (“crack”).”18  Concerning Count Five, the District Court instructed the jury 
that, to find Crews guilty, it must “be satisfied that the Government proved the weight or 
quantity beyond a reasonable doubt.”19  Further, the District Court noted that the jury had 
received “evidence during the course of this trial as to how much—what the weight was 
with respect to what was recovered and what was involved.”20  The jury was also 
specifically told that it must “determine the weight of the cocaine and cocaine base crack 
which was involved in the conspiracy,” and that “in making this decision, you should 
consider all the controlled substances that the members of the conspiracy actually 
distributed.”21  Finally, the District Court told the jury that they must “unanimously find 
                                              
16 Id. at 2155, 2163.   
 
17 United States v. Smith, 751 F.3d 107, 117 (3d Cir. 2014) (interpreting Alleyne).   
 
18 App. at 111a.  These were alleged violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). 
 
19 App. at 1504a.   
 
20 App. at 1505a.   
 
21 App. at 1505a.   
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the weight or quantity of cocaine that was involved in the 
conspiracy was five kilograms or more.”22  In finding Crews guilty of conspiracy, the 
jury unanimously determined that the conspiracy involved five or more kilograms of 
cocaine and 280 grams or more of cocaine base.23  But, as Crews submits, and the 
Government concedes, the jury did not determine an exact amount of cocaine and cocaine 
base directly attributable to Crews himself.  This lack of an individualized determination, 
the parties maintain, was error in light of Alleyne.  We agree.  However, such a lapse was 
harmless. 
 Alleyne errors can certainly be reviewed for harmlessness.  Recently, in United 
States v. Lewis,24 we applied a harmless error analysis to an Alleyne error, noting that, 
while the Supreme Court had not discussed such a review in Alleyne, the Court has “. . . 
adopted the general rule that a constitutional error does not automatically require reversal 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
22 App. at 1505a.  Similar instructions were given to the jury on the amount of cocaine 
base they needed to find (280 grams).  See App. at 1506a. 
 
23 App. at 1652a.  We note that after Crews and Miller were indicted, the Fair Sentencing 
Act of 2010 (FSA) was enacted.  It increased the amount of crack cocaine that triggers 
the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence from 50 grams to 280 grams.  On June 21, 
2012, the United States Supreme Court held that the more lenient penalties of the FSA 
apply to those offenders whose crimes occurred before the effective date of the Act 
(August 3, 2010), but who were sentenced after that date.  See Dorsey v. United States, 
132 S.Ct. 2321, 2335 (2012).  Here, the offenses being prosecuted occurred well before 
August of 2010 and the Appellees were sentenced well after that date.  Therefore, while 
the indictment charged them only with conspiracy to distribute 50 grams of crack 
cocaine, the District Court correctly instructed the jury that it had to find the conspiracy 
involved 280 grams of crack cocaine. 
 
24 802 F.3d 449 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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of a conviction,” and that the Supreme Court has “applied harmless error analysis to a 
wide range of errors and has recognized that most constitutional errors can be 
harmless.”25  Lewis provides an important template for our analysis in this case.  As a 
prerequisite, Lewis instructs that harmless error review may only be undertaken “when 
the defendant has made a timely objection to an error.”26  That was done here.  Crews’ 
objections to his sentence contained specific reference and argument to Alleyne, sufficient 
to satisfy this requirement.27  Lewis additionally reminds us that the Government has a 
heavy burden “to demonstrate that reversal is not warranted.”28  And lastly, Lewis notes 
the important distinction between trial errors and sentencing errors.29   
 Both types of errors are subject to harmless-error review, though our standard of 
review differs markedly for each one.  “Harmless-error review for a sentencing error 
turns on whether the error did or did not ‘contribute to the [sentence] obtained.’”30  By 
contrast, harmless-error review for a trial error “turns on whether it is ‘clear beyond a 
                                              
25 802 F.3d at 454 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991)).   
 
26 Id. (quoting United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2001)).   
 
27 See, e.g., App. at 1807a, 1874a.   
 
28 Lewis, 802 F.3d at 454 (quoting United States v. Waller, 654 F.3d 430, 438 (3d Cir. 
2011)).   
 
29 Id. 455 (citing United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2003)).   
 
30Id. at 456. 
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reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the 
error.’”31   
 In Lewis, we categorized the Alleyne error as “a pure sentencing error.”32  There, 
Lewis’s indictment charged him with the offense of using or carrying a firearm during 
and in relation to a crime of violence.  And at trial, the jury was properly instructed for 
that offense and found him guilty.  Yet the District Court sentenced him for brandishing a 
firearm during a crime of violence, which is a “‘separate, aggravated offense that must be 
found by a jury.’”33  We held that this was a “pure sentencing error,” as the jury was 
properly instructed at trial as to each element of the crime for which Lewis was indicted 
and found him guilty of that crime, but then the District Court sentenced him for a crime 
for which he was neither indicted nor tried.  As a result, applying harmless-error review, 
we considered whether the Alleyne error contributed to Lewis’s sentence, concluded that 
it did, and vacated the sentence and remanded.     
 Importantly, we also recognized in Lewis that “not . . . all Alleyne or Apprendi 
errors are pure sentencing errors.”34  For example, in United States v. Vasquez,35 we were 
confronted with “both a trial error and a resulting sentencing error.”36  There, Vasquez 
                                              
31 Id. (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).   
 
32 Id. at 455.  
  
33 Id. at 454 (quoting Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162 (2013)). 
 
34 Id. at 455. 
35 271 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2001). 
   
36 Id.   
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was indicted and tried for conspiring to possess and distribute more than five kilograms 
of cocaine.  But the District Court never properly instructed the jury at trial on drug 
quantity, which was an element of the offense for which he was indicted and tried.  As a 
result, Vasquez’s prescribed statutory maximum was 240 months, but the District Court, 
in violation of Apprendi, sentenced him to 288 months after finding at sentencing that he 
had possessed a certain quantity of drugs.  So, even though the District Court erred at 
sentencing, that error was caused by a trial error—i.e., its failure to submit to the jury an 
element of the offense for which he was indicted and tried.  And because this trial error 
was “comparable to the errors in both Neder [v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999)], and 
Johnson [v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997)],” we considered whether the evidence at 
trial established beyond a reasonable doubt that Vasquez had possessed the quantity of 
drugs found by the District Court and held that it did.37  In other words, we were 
“confident that Vazquez’s sentence would have been the same had the jury made the drug 
quantity finding.”38   
 The error in this case is akin to the trial error in Vasquez rather than the pure 
sentencing error in Lewis.  Like Vasquez’s indictment, Crews’ indictment charged him 
with conspiring to possess and distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine.  Yet the 
District Court never properly instructed the jury at trial that they had to determine the 
quantity of drugs specifically attributable to Crews and instead instructed it to determine 
the quantity of drugs attributable to the conspiracy as a whole.  Then, at sentencing, the 
                                              
37 Id. at 102.   
 
38 Id. at 104. 
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District Court, in violation of Alleyne, sentenced Crews to 240 months, which was the 
mandatory minimum for an offense involving five or more kilograms of cocaine.  
Accordingly, because the District Court’s Alleyne error was caused by a trial error, we 
can look to the trial record and conclude that the error was harmless because of the 
overwhelming evidence in support of the drug quantity.   
 For example, Crews supplied Vincent Graham with 4.5 to 9 ounce quantities of 
cocaine every five to seven days throughout 2003.39  And, evidence also established that 
Crews supplied Graham with 4.5 to 13 ounces of cocaine every five to seven days 
between May, 2005 and May, 2006.40  The trial record also reveals that Michael Durant 
sold Crews 20 to 25 kilograms of cocaine between 2004 and 2005.41  Before that, 
Emmanuel Moore supplied Crews with approximately 25 kilograms of cocaine between 
the fall of 2002 and early 2003.42  Evidence also established that Moore traveled to 
California two times per week between May 2003 and October 2004 and purchased “no 
less than 5” kilograms of cocaine per week for Crews.43  Indeed, Crews admits in his 
brief that “[i]n 2004, Moore purchased at least 20 kilos of cocaine on each trip to 
California; Crews would receive between five and eight of the kilos.”44  And, the record 
                                              
39 App. at 909a-15a.   
 
40 App. at 916a-17a.   
 
41 App. at 634a-38a.   
 
42 App. at 983a-84a, 988a-93a.   
 
43 App. at 998a-1003a.   
44 Crews Br. at 5 (citing App. at 1011a).   
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also establishes Crews received 20 kilograms of cocaine from a source Lofton had in 
North Carolina.45  Given all of this, including Crews’ admission on appeal, we have little 
difficulty concluding that the trial record contained overwhelming evidence of drug 
quantity attributable to Crews.  Therefore, we also have little difficulty concluding the 
District Court’s Alleyne error was harmless. 
 Crews next argues that the post-conviction assistance he gave the Government in 
other investigations required the Government to file a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(e).46  This argument is meritless as well. 
 At sentencing, the Government filed a motion for a downward variance from the 
applicable Guideline range pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, based on Crews’ post-
conviction cooperation, but elected not to file a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), 
which would have permitted the District Court to sentence Crews below the mandatory 
minimum sentence of 20 years.  Crews first attempts to connect this refusal to file a § 
3553(e) motion to the Government’s filing of a motion under §5K1.1.47  He tells us that, 
because these provisions operate under the “same principles,” the District Court 
mistakenly concluded that it lacked the authority to depart below the mandatory 
minimum sentence, the absence of a §3553(e) motion notwithstanding.  Crews is 
                                              
45 App. at 727a.   
 
46 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) provides: “Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have 
the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum 
sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or 
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.” 
 
47 Crews Br. at 27.   
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incorrect.  The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that § 5K1.1 and § 3553(e) 
somehow connect to form a unitary downward departure system whereby a § 5K1.1 
motion authorizes a district court to sentence below the mandatory minimum under § 
3553(e).48   
 Crews could possibly have received a sentence below the statutory minimum if the 
Government filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).49  It did not do so here and 
stated its reasons to the District Court in detail at the sentencing hearing.50  This makes 
the Government’s decision unreviewable unless the parties agreed that the Government 
would file such a motion and then did not do so, or that the Government’s reasons for not 
filing the motion were based on an unconstitutional motive, like a defendant’s race or 
religion.51  Crews had no agreement with the Government which would have required the 
filing of such a motion.  So, Crews is left to argue that the reasons provided by the 
                                              
48 Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120 (1996).   
 
49 See United States v. Kellum, 356 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a district 
court only has authority to depart below mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(e), (f)); Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 130 (1996) (a district 
court has no authority to impose a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum when 
the government has not made a motion pursuant to § 3553(e)).  There are two other 
avenues whereby a district court might impose a sentence less than the statutory 
mandatory minimum—Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) and the safety value set 
out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(7)—which are inapplicable here. 
 
50 App. at 1876a-1882a. 
 
51 See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992).   
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Government for not filing the § 3553(e) motion are “not rationally related to any 
legitimate Government end.”52  He bears the burden on this point and has not met it.53   
 The Government set out numerous reasons in support of its decision not to file a § 
3553(e) motion: the extent and breadth of Crews’ drug trafficking and money laundering 
activities, the decades-long duration of the conspiracy, Crews’ leadership role, the 
massive amounts of drugs put onto the streets of Philadelphia through Crews’ actions, the 
large number of individuals involved in Crews’ activities, Crews’ continuation of drug 
trafficking activities despite his conviction and supervised release for the same activities 
in 1995, the timing of his cooperation with the Government—which he gave only after 
being convicted—his post-conviction offer of information on the criminal activities of 
witnesses who testified against him, Crews’ failure to accept responsibility for his crimes, 
the sentences imposed on his co-defendants and the level of departure granted to 
witnesses who cooperated, and the level of intimidation those witnesses faced as a result 
of their trial testimony against Crews.54  The District Court found no arbitrariness among 
these reasons nor do we.  Crews maintains that several of the Government’s reasons were 
indeed arbitrary, yet he offers us very few specifics or support for his contentions.  Mere 
claims that Crews provided substantial assistance and generalized allegations of the 
Government’s improper motive do not “entitle a defendant to a remedy . . ..”55   
                                              
52 Id.   
 
53 Id. at 186. 
 
54 App. at 1879a-1883a. 
 
55 Wade, 504 U.S. at  186.   
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 He argues, for example, that some defendants “more deeply involved in the same 
conspiracy as Crews testified at trial and received lesser sentences.”56  But, Crews’ scant 
paragraph of conclusory argument on this point lacks supporting facts from which a 
viable claim of arbitrariness can spring.  Additionally, Crews suggests that the 
Government’s decision not to file the § 3553(e) motion amounted to an impermissible 
attempt by the Government to control the exercise of judicial authority.57  This is a 
separation of powers argument.  He characterizes the Government’s concern with 
avoiding sentencing disparities as representative of a “[d]isagreement with and distrust of 
judicial authority.”58  However, Crews ignores the fact that a statute—§ 3553(e)—gives 
the Government authority to make the decision whether to file the motion and that this 
statutory mandate is not a usurpation of judicial power.  We have noted that, “[w]hen 
Congress establishes a minimum sentence for a particular crime, district courts are 
required to sentence defendants guilty of that crime to a term of imprisonment no less 
than the Congressionally prescribed minimum, unless an explicit exception to the 
minimum sentence applies.”59  Indeed, the Supreme Court has “consistently recognized 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
56 Crews Br. at 30. 
 
57Id.  
 
58 Id.  
 
59 United States v. Winebarger, 664 F.3d 388, 392 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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that Congress has plenary authority over the designation of appropriate punishment for 
federal crimes.”60 
 Lastly, Crews charges that the Government arbitrarily took the timing of his 
cooperation into account when deciding not to file the § 3553(e) motion.  He argues, 
more specifically, that he was penalized for exercising his right to trial.  That did not 
happen here.  At sentencing the Government acknowledged distinctions between Crews 
and his co-defendants, recognizing that the co-defendants who pleaded guilty and offered 
meaningful assistance to the Government received lesser sentences.61  Further, the 
Government acknowledged that Crews had the right to proceed to trial and that the 
Government was not penalizing him for exercising that right.62  There is no evidence, 
however, of unconstitutional conduct by the Government.  Instead, the Government made 
the decision not to file the § 3553(e) motion after weighing the quantity and quality of 
Crews’ assistance; assistance it did not find substantial enough to warrant the filing of the 
motion.  For example, while Crews did provide information on unsolved murders 
allegedly committed by his co-conspirators, the information was decades old and, as the 
Government noted, it does not typically prosecute murder cases.63  Crews also gave the 
Government information concerning a cell phone that another co-conspirator used, 
                                              
60 United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1010 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. 
Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978). 
 
61 See App. at 1879a. 
 
62 Id. 
 
63 Id. 
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information that the Government acknowledged as useful during the penalty phase of that 
co-conspirator’s trial.64  However, since Crews was by then a convicted felon, thereby 
diminishing the reliability of his testimony in the eyes of a jury, the Government elected 
not to call him to testify in that case.  The foregoing reasons do not reflect a motivation to 
punish Crews for exercising his right to a trial.  Instead, they reflect the Government’s 
rational consideration of the value of Crews’ assistance as compared to that offered by 
other conspirators.  We agree, therefore, with the District Court that the Government did 
not act arbitrarily in declining to file a § 3553(e) motion. 
 Crews next argues that § 841(b)(1)(A)’s mandatory minimum sentence “conflicts” 
with the parsimony provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which provides that a district court 
“shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to accomplish the 
goals of sentencing.65  Specifically, Crews maintains that the District Court was unable to 
carry out its judicial function, as set forth in the mandates of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 
because it had to comply with the mandatory 20 year sentence.  We have previously 
rejected such challenges to mandatory minimum sentences.66  These decisions are 
                                              
64 Id. 
 
65 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).   
 
66 See United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Walker, 473 
F.3d 71, 85 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that there is no conflict between § 3553 and a 
mandatory minimum sentence provision because “ § 3553(a) must be read in conjunction 
with § 3553(e), which prohibits the court from sentencing a defendant below the statutory 
mandatory minimum sentence unless the Government files a motion permitting such 
departure”); United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 251–52 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Congress 
has the power to define criminal punishments without giving the courts any sentencing 
discretion.” (quoting Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)).   
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binding precedent, and consequently resolve Crews’ argument in favor of the 
Government.  Therefore, we need not discuss this particular issue in any greater detail. 
 We likewise need not discuss Crews’ next issue in any great depth.  Crews 
challenges the enhancement of his sentence due to his prior criminal conviction.  Title 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) contains a proviso whereby a mandatory minimum sentence can 
be doubled because of a prior criminal conviction.  Crews argues that the existence of his 
prior conviction was an element of his offense and, as such, had to be alleged in the 
indictment and proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  This argument has been 
rejected.67  The District Court was thus fully empowered to make the necessary findings 
to double Crews’ mandatory minimum sentence based on a prior conviction. 
 Lastly on the question of his sentence, Crews attacks the information filed by the 
Government pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, which doubled Crews’ mandatory minimum 
sentence.  Specifically, he claims the notice he received of this enhancement was 
deficient.  We disagree.  Section 851 provides: 
No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part 
shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one 
or more prior convictions, unless before trial, or before entry 
of a plea of guilty, the United States attorney files an 
information with the court (and serves a copy of such 
information on the person or counsel for the person) stating in 
writing the previous convictions to be relied upon....68 
                                              
67 Almendarez–Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 246–47 (1998) (prior conviction 
that increases maximum penalty need not be treated as element of offense and proven to a 
jury); United States v. Blair, 734 F.3d 218, 227 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Alleyne do[es] nothing to 
restrict the established exception under Almendarez–Torres that allows judges to consider 
prior convictions.”). 
 
68 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). 
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We review the sufficiency of the Government’s notice de novo and agree with the 
District Court that Crews was provided with sufficient notice of the Government’s 
intention to rely on his prior felony conviction to enhance his sentence.69  
 The Government’s information stated the following: 
On or about February 21, 1996, defendant Jaquel Crews was 
sentenced in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania on his guilty plea to the felony drug 
offenses of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and distribution 
of cocaine base, at Criminal Number 95-0391, to a term of 56 
months, and 4 year supervised release.  Jaquel Crews is 
charged in the Second Superseding Indictment, Criminal No. 
10-663-2, with, in Count Five, conspiracy to possess with 
intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  Jaquel Crews’ prior felony drug 
conviction serves as the basis for increased punishment 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(B)(1)(b).70  
 
Crews asserts that this notice was faulty because it omits the date his prior trafficking 
conviction became final and did not specifically mention that this conviction became 
final before the offense dates in the instant prosecution.  We have never required such 
specificity, however.  Instead, all that is required is that the § 851 notice provide a 
defendant with reasonable notice of the Government’s intention to rely on a previous 
conviction and an opportunity to be heard on the issue.71  The notice in this case satisfies 
these basic requirements.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
69 United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 246 (3d Cir. 2001). 
70 App. at 1671a-72a. 
 
71 See Weaver, 267 F.3d at 247. 
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 In sum, we see no error in the application of the mandatory minimum sentence to 
Appellant Crews. 
Enhancement for Leadership Role 
 Crews complains that the District Court incorrectly determined that he was a 
leader of the drug conspiracy and, therefore, erroneously enhanced his sentence by four 
levels.72  We review a district court’s ruling on a sentencing enhancement that requires a 
predominately factual inquiry for clear error.73  The leadership enhancement is such an 
inquiry and it is appropriately activated if the evidence shows that Crews exercised some 
degree of control over at least one other person involved in the offense.74  We find no 
clear error in the District Court’s determination that Crews bore a leadership or 
organizational role in the offense.  The evidence established, for example, that Crews 
supervised Donielle Fletcher in the production, packaging, storage, and delivery of 
cocaine from her residence.75  Further, evidence also established that Crews directed 
Craig Lofton and others to purchase large amounts of cocaine on buying trips to 
California.  Crews paid for these trips from his own funds and answered to no one for 
these excursions.76  As the District Court aptly summarized, “[t]hose deals were his 
                                              
72 See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). 
 
73 United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 
74United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2010); see also U.S.S.G. § 
3B1.1 app. note 2.  
 
75 App. at 262a-269a. 
 
76 See App. 1859a-69a. 
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deals.”77  Accordingly, the District Court did not clearly err in determining that the four-
level leadership enhancement applied.  
Issues Related to the Forfeiture Determination 
 Both Miller and Crews challenge the forfeiture judgments entered against them, 
raising different points of attack.78  The Government sought forfeiture pursuant to 21 
U.S.C. §853, which limits forfeiture to “any property constituting, or derived from any 
proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation; or any of 
the person’s property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to 
facilitate the commission of, such violations.”79  The standard of proof is preponderance 
of the evidence.80  The District Court granted the forfeiture motion in the amount of $5 
million, and in doing so, indicated that its decision was supported by both a proceeds 
theory and a facilitating property theory of forfeiture.81 
 We will start with a challenge to the forfeiture raised by Appellant Miller.  Miller 
asserts that the District Court, as opposed to the jury, unconstitutionally made certain 
factual findings in ordering the forfeiture.  Our decision in United States v. Leahy, and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
                                                              
77 App. at 1867a. 
 
78 As these issues present questions of law, we exercise plenary review. United States v. 
Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 198 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Ledesma–
Cuesta, 347 F.3d 527, 530 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
 
79 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1), (2). 
 
80 United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 333 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
81 App. at 11. 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Libretti v. United States preclude Miller’s argument.82  
Those decisions clearly hold that the right to a jury is not implicated in criminal forfeiture 
proceedings.83  In light of this controlling precedent, Miller’s claim is untenable.84   
 For his part, Crews contends that the District Court lacked statutory authority to 
impose a $5 million money judgment against him personally under 21 U.S.C. § 
853(a)(1).  This argument likewise fails when confronted with our prior precedent.  In 
United States v. Vampire Nation, we specifically held that “in personam forfeiture 
judgments are appropriate under 21 U.S.C. § 853, even where the amount of the 
judgment exceeds the defendant’s available assets at the time of conviction.”85  Crews 
makes several attempts to distinguish our decision in Vampire Nation from his case, all of 
which are unavailing.  For example, he believes Vampire Nation is inapplicable because 
the forfeiture there was rooted in 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), a civil forfeiture provision 
that was made enforceable in criminal prosecutions by 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), whereas his 
                                              
82 438 F.3d 328, 331 (3d Cir. 2006)(en banc); 516 U.S. 29, 48-49 (1995). 
 
83 See, e.g., Libretti, 516 U.S. at 49. 
 
84 The Appellants call our attention to the Supreme Court’s decision in Southern Union 
Co. v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2344 (2014), arguing that opinion casts serious doubt on 
the continued validity of Libretti.  In Southern Union, the Supreme Court applied 
Apprendi to the imposition of criminal fines, thereby requiring a jury determination 
before fines can be imposed.  The Appellants urge us to view Libretti as effectively 
overruled, and ask us to now require a jury determination in the context of criminal 
forfeitures, just as Southern Union required it for criminal fines.  This, we cannot do.  
Libretti has not been overruled, and we are obligated to follow its clear holding that “the 
right to a jury verdict on forfeitability does not fall within the Sixth Amendment’s 
constitutional protection.”  516 U.S. at 49.   
 
85 451 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir. 2006).   
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forfeiture was imposed directly under § 853.  This argument is meritless.  Our decision in 
Vampire Nation specifically addresses § 853 forfeitures.86   
 Next, Crews pivots and argues that Vampire Nation does not apply because that 
case concerned § 853’s procedural provisions, while his forfeiture was premised on that 
section’s substantive authority.  Yet, Crews offers us no supporting authority to validate 
this distinction, nor does he attempt to explain the importance of such a difference.  The 
Government, however, did find case law rejecting Crews’ argument.  The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit looked at this issue and found “no meaningful difference” 
between an in personam forfeiture judgment arising directly from § 853, and an in 
personam forfeiture that might arise from § 853 by way of another statute, 28 U.S.C. § 
2461(c), for example.87  We agree.  Lastly, Crews tries to get out from our holding in 
Vampire Nation by arguing that that opinion never addressed the point he advances here: 
in personam money judgments are not available under § 853.  This is not the case.  We 
did address this argument in Vampire Nation, specifically holding that “an in personam 
forfeiture judgment may be entered for the full amount of the criminal proceeds.”88  This 
holding precludes Crews’ argument. 
                                              
86 Id. at  203. 
 
87 United States v. Kalish, 626 F.3d 165, 169 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 
88 451 F.3d at 202-03. 
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 To conclude, the Appellants’ claims that in personam forfeiture money judgments 
are unavailable in the context of their drug trafficking sentences are erroneous.  We find 
no error in the District Court’s imposition of such a judgment. 
 As a parallel argument, Crews contends the District Court lacked the authority to 
enter an in personam money judgment against him based on a facilitating property theory.  
Here, he finds fault with the indictment.  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 32, “[a] court must not enter a judgment of forfeiture in a criminal proceeding 
unless the indictment or information contains notice to the defendant that the Government 
will seek the forfeiture of property as part of any sentence in accordance with the 
applicable statute.”89  Crews argues that the forfeiture judgment was invalid because 
while the phrase “the sum of $5,000,000” was indicated in the proceeds section of the 
indictment, it was not repeated in the forfeiture property section.90  This reading of the 
rule is too restrictive.  Rule 32 and due process only require that notice of the possible 
forfeiture be given to a defendant and that a defendant have an opportunity to be heard.91  
An indictment is sufficiently specific as long as it “puts the defendant on notice that the 
government seeks forfeiture and identifies the assets with sufficient specificity to permit 
the defendant to marshal evidence in their defense.”92  Here, the indictment gave Crews 
                                              
89  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a). 
 
90 Appellant Miller joins in this argument. 
 
91 See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 48–50 (1993). 
 
92 See, e.g., United States v. Loe, 248 F.3d 449, 464 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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ample notice that the Government intended to seek a $5 million forfeiture money 
judgment and the fact that this request was not repeated in separate sections of the 
indictment is not an error.   
 Crews also argues that the District Court erred by imposing joint and several 
liability based on the forfeited property.  Here, we share the Government’s belief that this 
argument is largely academic, given that joint and several liability was also imposed by 
the District Court based on the proceeds of the conspiracy, an action which our prior 
precedent clearly endorses.93  Crews claims that the language of 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2) 
limits the scope of a forfeiture under the facilitating property theory to that property 
belonging only to him.  We do not agree.  Section 853(a)(2) permits the forfeiture of “any 
of the person’s property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, 
or to facilitate the commission of” the crime.  Crews keys-in on the words “any person” 
and “the person’s” as language, he says, that limits the extent of the forfeiture to property 
that belongs solely to him.  Crews neglects to mention, however, that the proceeds 
section of § 853 contains the same language and we have held that language to take in all 
the property possessed by any member of the conspiracy.94  In United States v. Pitts, we 
noted that § 853(a)(1) “does not say that each conspirator shall forfeit only such property 
involved in the offense which is or has even been in that conspirator’s possession.  
                                              
93 See, e.g., United States v. Pitts, 193 F.3d 751, 765 (3d Cir. 1999); see also United States 
v. Van Nguyen, 602 F.3d 886, 904 (8th Cir. 2010) (imposing joint and several liability 
with respect to forfeiture of proceeds of a drug conspiracy). 
 
94193 F.3d 751, 765 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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Rather, the statute recognizes that the amount of property involved in a . . . conspiracy 
cannot be different for different conspirators.”95  Given the identical language in § 
853(a)(2), we see no reason not to apply this holding to that section.  And, Crews has 
offered us none.  We therefore see no error in the District Court’s order of forfeiture. 
 Lastly, Appellant Miller argues that the District Court should have made a 
foreseeability determination before imposing joint and several forfeiture liability.  He 
acknowledges, however, that he failed to “object on this basis below.”96  We, therefore, 
apply a plain error review to his claims.97  Miller insists that we should apply plenary 
review to this claim nonetheless because he did not have an opportunity to object to the 
lack of a foreseeability finding.98  Specifically, he says that he could not have known the 
District Court would impose joint and several liability on him without a foreseeability 
determination until the District Court issued its order and memorandum.99  By that time, 
he maintains, it was too late for him to object.  We disagree.  Miller had plenty of time 
and opportunity to object.  Indeed, almost a year would pass between the entry of the 
District Court’s forfeiture order and Miller’s sentencing.100  Nothing prevented Miller 
                                              
95 Id. 
 
96 Miller Br. at 40. 
 
97 United States v. Berger, 689 F.3d 297, 299 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 
98 Miller Brief at 40. 
 
99 Id. 
 
100 The forfeiture order and accompanying memorandum were filed on August 14, 2012 
and Miller was sentenced on July 24, 2013. 
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from filing an objection to the forfeiture based on a lack of foreseeability during that 
time.  This is because a forfeiture order only becomes final at the time of sentencing.101  
Therefore, given this omission, we review Miller’s claim for plain error.102 
 Under the plain error standard, we may reverse the District Court's ruling only if 
there was “(1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) which 
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”103  
There was no error here, much less a plain one.  We have held that a District Court may 
impose joint and several liability on co-defendants as part of a forfeiture money 
judgment.104  And, while other courts may have done so, we have not held that a 
foreseeability finding is required prior to the imposition of joint and several liability on 
co-defendants.  Therefore, we see no error.  Even were we to find error, it certainly would 
not be plain, given that a foreseeability requirement is not uniformly required.  Miller 
calls our attention to decisions from other circuits that have required a foreseeability 
finding—United States v. Elder,105 for example.  He also points out that we have issued a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
101 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A); United States v. Pelullo, 178 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
 
102 See United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 156 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 
30; Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 631 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 
103 United States v. Paladino, 769 F.3d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 
104 United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 765 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
105 682 F.3d 1065 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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non-precedential opinion requiring such a determination.106  However, courts are not 
harmonized in their view that a foreseeability requirement is necessary.  The Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, for example, has specifically rejected a foreseeability 
requirement, relying on Supreme Court precedent.107  And, our decision in Plaskett, as 
the parties recognize, was a non-precedential opinion issued under our I.O.P. 5.7, and as 
such lacks precedential authority and is non-binding on any subsequent case or panel.  
Given these contrary opinions, we cannot say that the District Court’s lack of a 
foreseeability determination was obvious error.108 
Conclusion 
 In light of the foregoing, we will affirm the convictions of Appellants Crews and 
Miller, the sentence of Appellant Crews, and the forfeiture money judgments entered 
against both Appellants in the District Court. 
 
                                              
106 United States v. Plaskett, 355 F. App’x 639 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 
107 See, e.g., United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1279 (11th Cir. 2007).   
 
108 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-35 (1993) (“To demonstrate “plain error,” a 
defendant must prove that the Court erred, that the error was “clear” or “obvious,” and 
that the error “affect[ed] substantial rights” of the defendant.). 
